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Diffstat (limited to 'chromium/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc')
-rw-r--r--chromium/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc352
1 files changed, 240 insertions, 112 deletions
diff --git a/chromium/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc b/chromium/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc
index 8e91c2f17e5..60f08b6ad63 100644
--- a/chromium/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc
+++ b/chromium/content/zygote/zygote_main_linux.cc
@@ -5,25 +5,24 @@
#include "content/zygote/zygote_main.h"
#include <dlfcn.h>
-#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "base/basictypes.h"
#include "base/bind.h"
-#include "base/callback.h"
#include "base/command_line.h"
-#include "base/linux_util.h"
+#include "base/compiler_specific.h"
+#include "base/memory/scoped_vector.h"
#include "base/native_library.h"
#include "base/pickle.h"
+#include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
#include "base/posix/unix_domain_socket_linux.h"
#include "base/rand_util.h"
+#include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
#include "base/sys_info.h"
#include "build/build_config.h"
#include "content/common/child_process_sandbox_support_impl_linux.h"
@@ -38,23 +37,24 @@
#include "content/public/common/zygote_fork_delegate_linux.h"
#include "content/zygote/zygote_linux.h"
#include "crypto/nss_util.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/services/init_process_reaper.h"
#include "sandbox/linux/services/libc_urandom_override.h"
#include "sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.h"
#include "third_party/icu/source/i18n/unicode/timezone.h"
#include "third_party/skia/include/ports/SkFontConfigInterface.h"
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
-#include <sys/epoll.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
-#include <sys/signal.h>
-#else
-#include <signal.h>
#endif
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
#include "third_party/libjingle/overrides/init_webrtc.h"
#endif
+#if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
+#include <sanitizer/asan_interface.h>
+#endif
+
namespace content {
// See http://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxZygote
@@ -195,7 +195,12 @@ struct tm* localtime_override(const time_t* timep) {
} else {
CHECK_EQ(0, pthread_once(&g_libc_localtime_funcs_guard,
InitLibcLocaltimeFunctions));
- return g_libc_localtime(timep);
+ struct tm* res = g_libc_localtime(timep);
+#if defined(MEMORY_SANITIZER)
+ if (res) __msan_unpoison(res, sizeof(*res));
+ if (res->tm_zone) __msan_unpoison_string(res->tm_zone);
+#endif
+ return res;
}
}
@@ -214,7 +219,12 @@ struct tm* localtime64_override(const time_t* timep) {
} else {
CHECK_EQ(0, pthread_once(&g_libc_localtime_funcs_guard,
InitLibcLocaltimeFunctions));
- return g_libc_localtime64(timep);
+ struct tm* res = g_libc_localtime64(timep);
+#if defined(MEMORY_SANITIZER)
+ if (res) __msan_unpoison(res, sizeof(*res));
+ if (res->tm_zone) __msan_unpoison_string(res->tm_zone);
+#endif
+ return res;
}
}
@@ -230,7 +240,12 @@ struct tm* localtime_r_override(const time_t* timep, struct tm* result) {
} else {
CHECK_EQ(0, pthread_once(&g_libc_localtime_funcs_guard,
InitLibcLocaltimeFunctions));
- return g_libc_localtime_r(timep, result);
+ struct tm* res = g_libc_localtime_r(timep, result);
+#if defined(MEMORY_SANITIZER)
+ if (res) __msan_unpoison(res, sizeof(*res));
+ if (res->tm_zone) __msan_unpoison_string(res->tm_zone);
+#endif
+ return res;
}
}
@@ -246,7 +261,12 @@ struct tm* localtime64_r_override(const time_t* timep, struct tm* result) {
} else {
CHECK_EQ(0, pthread_once(&g_libc_localtime_funcs_guard,
InitLibcLocaltimeFunctions));
- return g_libc_localtime64_r(timep, result);
+ struct tm* res = g_libc_localtime64_r(timep, result);
+#if defined(MEMORY_SANITIZER)
+ if (res) __msan_unpoison(res, sizeof(*res));
+ if (res->tm_zone) __msan_unpoison_string(res->tm_zone);
+#endif
+ return res;
}
}
@@ -259,12 +279,12 @@ void PreloadPepperPlugins() {
ComputePepperPluginList(&plugins);
for (size_t i = 0; i < plugins.size(); ++i) {
if (!plugins[i].is_internal && plugins[i].is_sandboxed) {
- std::string error;
+ base::NativeLibraryLoadError error;
base::NativeLibrary library = base::LoadNativeLibrary(plugins[i].path,
&error);
VLOG_IF(1, !library) << "Unable to load plugin "
<< plugins[i].path.value() << " "
- << error;
+ << error.ToString();
(void)library; // Prevent release-mode warning.
}
@@ -274,7 +294,7 @@ void PreloadPepperPlugins() {
// This function triggers the static and lazy construction of objects that need
// to be created before imposing the sandbox.
-static void PreSandboxInit() {
+static void ZygotePreSandboxInit() {
base::RandUint64();
base::SysInfo::AmountOfPhysicalMemory();
@@ -311,132 +331,240 @@ static void PreSandboxInit() {
new FontConfigIPC(GetSandboxFD()))->unref();
}
-static void CloseFdAndHandleEintr(int fd) {
- close(fd);
+static bool CreateInitProcessReaper(base::Closure* post_fork_parent_callback) {
+ // The current process becomes init(1), this function returns from a
+ // newly created process.
+ const bool init_created =
+ sandbox::CreateInitProcessReaper(post_fork_parent_callback);
+ if (!init_created) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Error creating an init process to reap zombies";
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
}
-// This will set the *using_suid_sandbox variable to true if the SUID sandbox
-// is enabled. This does not necessarily exclude other types of sandboxing.
-static bool EnterSuidSandbox(LinuxSandbox* linux_sandbox,
- bool* using_suid_sandbox,
- bool* has_started_new_init) {
- *using_suid_sandbox = false;
- *has_started_new_init = false;
-
- sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient* setuid_sandbox =
- linux_sandbox->setuid_sandbox_client();
+// Enter the setuid sandbox. This requires the current process to have been
+// created through the setuid sandbox.
+static bool EnterSuidSandbox(sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient* setuid_sandbox,
+ base::Closure* post_fork_parent_callback) {
+ DCHECK(setuid_sandbox);
+ DCHECK(setuid_sandbox->IsSuidSandboxChild());
+
+ // Use the SUID sandbox. This still allows the seccomp sandbox to
+ // be enabled by the process later.
+
+ if (!setuid_sandbox->IsSuidSandboxUpToDate()) {
+ LOG(WARNING) <<
+ "You are using a wrong version of the setuid binary!\n"
+ "Please read "
+ "https://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxSUIDSandboxDevelopment."
+ "\n\n";
+ }
- if (!setuid_sandbox)
+ if (!setuid_sandbox->ChrootMe())
return false;
- PreSandboxInit();
-
- // Check that the pre-sandbox initialization didn't spawn threads.
- DCHECK(linux_sandbox->IsSingleThreaded());
+ if (setuid_sandbox->IsInNewPIDNamespace()) {
+ CHECK_EQ(1, getpid())
+ << "The SUID sandbox created a new PID namespace but Zygote "
+ "is not the init process. Please, make sure the SUID "
+ "binary is up to date.";
+ }
- if (setuid_sandbox->IsSuidSandboxChild()) {
- // Use the SUID sandbox. This still allows the seccomp sandbox to
- // be enabled by the process later.
- *using_suid_sandbox = true;
+ if (getpid() == 1) {
+ // The setuid sandbox has created a new PID namespace and we need
+ // to assume the role of init.
+ CHECK(CreateInitProcessReaper(post_fork_parent_callback));
+ }
- if (!setuid_sandbox->IsSuidSandboxUpToDate()) {
- LOG(WARNING) << "You are using a wrong version of the setuid binary!\n"
- "Please read "
- "https://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxSUIDSandboxDevelopment."
- "\n\n";
+#if !defined(OS_OPENBSD)
+ // Previously, we required that the binary be non-readable. This causes the
+ // kernel to mark the process as non-dumpable at startup. The thinking was
+ // that, although we were putting the renderers into a PID namespace (with
+ // the SUID sandbox), they would nonetheless be in the /same/ PID
+ // namespace. So they could ptrace each other unless they were non-dumpable.
+ //
+ // If the binary was readable, then there would be a window between process
+ // startup and the point where we set the non-dumpable flag in which a
+ // compromised renderer could ptrace attach.
+ //
+ // However, now that we have a zygote model, only the (trusted) zygote
+ // exists at this point and we can set the non-dumpable flag which is
+ // inherited by all our renderer children.
+ //
+ // Note: a non-dumpable process can't be debugged. To debug sandbox-related
+ // issues, one can specify --allow-sandbox-debugging to let the process be
+ // dumpable.
+ const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
+ if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowSandboxDebugging)) {
+ prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ if (prctl(PR_GET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set non-dumpable flag";
+ return false;
}
+ }
+#endif
- if (!setuid_sandbox->ChrootMe())
- return false;
+ return true;
+}
- if (getpid() == 1) {
- // The setuid sandbox has created a new PID namespace and we need
- // to assume the role of init.
- // This "magic" socket must only appear in one process, so make sure
- // it gets closed in the parent after fork().
- base::Closure zygoteid_fd_closer =
- base::Bind(CloseFdAndHandleEintr, kZygoteIdFd);
- const bool init_created =
- setuid_sandbox->CreateInitProcessReaper(&zygoteid_fd_closer);
- if (!init_created) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error creating an init process to reap zombies";
- return false;
- }
- *has_started_new_init = true;
+#if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
+const size_t kSanitizerMaxMessageLength = 1 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+// A helper process which collects code coverage data from the renderers over a
+// socket and dumps it to a file. See http://crbug.com/336212 for discussion.
+static void SanitizerCoverageHelper(int socket_fd, int file_fd) {
+ scoped_ptr<char[]> buffer(new char[kSanitizerMaxMessageLength]);
+ while (true) {
+ ssize_t received_size = HANDLE_EINTR(
+ recv(socket_fd, buffer.get(), kSanitizerMaxMessageLength, 0));
+ PCHECK(received_size >= 0);
+ if (received_size == 0)
+ // All clients have closed the socket. We should die.
+ _exit(0);
+ PCHECK(file_fd >= 0);
+ ssize_t written_size = 0;
+ while (written_size < received_size) {
+ ssize_t write_res =
+ HANDLE_EINTR(write(file_fd, buffer.get() + written_size,
+ received_size - written_size));
+ PCHECK(write_res >= 0);
+ written_size += write_res;
}
+ PCHECK(0 == HANDLE_EINTR(fsync(file_fd)));
+ }
+}
-#if !defined(OS_OPENBSD)
- // Previously, we required that the binary be non-readable. This causes the
- // kernel to mark the process as non-dumpable at startup. The thinking was
- // that, although we were putting the renderers into a PID namespace (with
- // the SUID sandbox), they would nonetheless be in the /same/ PID
- // namespace. So they could ptrace each other unless they were non-dumpable.
- //
- // If the binary was readable, then there would be a window between process
- // startup and the point where we set the non-dumpable flag in which a
- // compromised renderer could ptrace attach.
- //
- // However, now that we have a zygote model, only the (trusted) zygote
- // exists at this point and we can set the non-dumpable flag which is
- // inherited by all our renderer children.
- //
- // Note: a non-dumpable process can't be debugged. To debug sandbox-related
- // issues, one can specify --allow-sandbox-debugging to let the process be
- // dumpable.
- const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
- if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowSandboxDebugging)) {
- prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0);
- if (prctl(PR_GET_DUMPABLE, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set non-dumpable flag";
- return false;
- }
- }
-#endif
+// fds[0] is the read end, fds[1] is the write end.
+static void CreateSanitizerCoverageSocketPair(int fds[2]) {
+ PCHECK(0 == socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, fds));
+ PCHECK(0 == shutdown(fds[0], SHUT_WR));
+ PCHECK(0 == shutdown(fds[1], SHUT_RD));
+}
+
+static pid_t ForkSanitizerCoverageHelper(int child_fd, int parent_fd,
+ base::ScopedFD file_fd) {
+ pid_t pid = fork();
+ PCHECK(pid >= 0);
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ // In the child.
+ PCHECK(0 == IGNORE_EINTR(close(parent_fd)));
+ SanitizerCoverageHelper(child_fd, file_fd.get());
+ _exit(0);
+ } else {
+ // In the parent.
+ PCHECK(0 == IGNORE_EINTR(close(child_fd)));
+ return pid;
}
+}
- return true;
+void CloseFdPair(const int fds[2]) {
+ PCHECK(0 == IGNORE_EINTR(close(fds[0])));
+ PCHECK(0 == IGNORE_EINTR(close(fds[1])));
+}
+#endif // defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
+
+// If |is_suid_sandbox_child|, then make sure that the setuid sandbox is
+// engaged.
+static void EnterLayerOneSandbox(LinuxSandbox* linux_sandbox,
+ bool is_suid_sandbox_child,
+ base::Closure* post_fork_parent_callback) {
+ DCHECK(linux_sandbox);
+
+ ZygotePreSandboxInit();
+
+ // Check that the pre-sandbox initialization didn't spawn threads.
+#if !defined(THREAD_SANITIZER)
+ DCHECK(linux_sandbox->IsSingleThreaded());
+#endif
+
+ sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient* setuid_sandbox =
+ linux_sandbox->setuid_sandbox_client();
+
+ if (is_suid_sandbox_child) {
+ CHECK(EnterSuidSandbox(setuid_sandbox, post_fork_parent_callback))
+ << "Failed to enter setuid sandbox";
+ }
}
bool ZygoteMain(const MainFunctionParams& params,
- ZygoteForkDelegate* forkdelegate) {
+ ScopedVector<ZygoteForkDelegate> fork_delegates) {
g_am_zygote_or_renderer = true;
sandbox::InitLibcUrandomOverrides();
+ base::Closure *post_fork_parent_callback = NULL;
+
LinuxSandbox* linux_sandbox = LinuxSandbox::GetInstance();
+
+#if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
+ const std::string sancov_file_name =
+ "zygote." + base::Uint64ToString(base::RandUint64());
+ base::ScopedFD sancov_file_fd(
+ __sanitizer_maybe_open_cov_file(sancov_file_name.c_str()));
+ int sancov_socket_fds[2] = {-1, -1};
+ CreateSanitizerCoverageSocketPair(sancov_socket_fds);
+ linux_sandbox->sanitizer_args()->coverage_sandboxed = 1;
+ linux_sandbox->sanitizer_args()->coverage_fd = sancov_socket_fds[1];
+ linux_sandbox->sanitizer_args()->coverage_max_block_size =
+ kSanitizerMaxMessageLength;
+ // Zygote termination will block until the helper process exits, which will
+ // not happen until the write end of the socket is closed everywhere. Make
+ // sure the init process does not hold on to it.
+ base::Closure close_sancov_socket_fds =
+ base::Bind(&CloseFdPair, sancov_socket_fds);
+ post_fork_parent_callback = &close_sancov_socket_fds;
+#endif
+
// This will pre-initialize the various sandboxes that need it.
linux_sandbox->PreinitializeSandbox();
- if (forkdelegate != NULL) {
- VLOG(1) << "ZygoteMain: initializing fork delegate";
- forkdelegate->Init(GetSandboxFD());
- } else {
- VLOG(1) << "ZygoteMain: fork delegate is NULL";
- }
-
- // Turn on the sandbox.
- bool using_suid_sandbox = false;
- bool has_started_new_init = false;
+ const bool must_enable_setuid_sandbox =
+ linux_sandbox->setuid_sandbox_client()->IsSuidSandboxChild();
+ if (must_enable_setuid_sandbox) {
+ linux_sandbox->setuid_sandbox_client()->CloseDummyFile();
- if (!EnterSuidSandbox(linux_sandbox,
- &using_suid_sandbox,
- &has_started_new_init)) {
- LOG(FATAL) << "Failed to enter sandbox. Fail safe abort. (errno: "
- << errno << ")";
- return false;
+ // Let the ZygoteHost know we're booting up.
+ CHECK(UnixDomainSocket::SendMsg(kZygoteSocketPairFd,
+ kZygoteBootMessage,
+ sizeof(kZygoteBootMessage),
+ std::vector<int>()));
}
- sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient* setuid_sandbox =
- linux_sandbox->setuid_sandbox_client();
-
- if (setuid_sandbox->IsInNewPIDNamespace() && !has_started_new_init) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "The SUID sandbox created a new PID namespace but Zygote "
- "is not the init process. Please, make sure the SUID "
- "binary is up to date.";
+ VLOG(1) << "ZygoteMain: initializing " << fork_delegates.size()
+ << " fork delegates";
+ for (ScopedVector<ZygoteForkDelegate>::iterator i = fork_delegates.begin();
+ i != fork_delegates.end();
+ ++i) {
+ (*i)->Init(GetSandboxFD(), must_enable_setuid_sandbox);
}
+ // Turn on the first layer of the sandbox if the configuration warrants it.
+ EnterLayerOneSandbox(linux_sandbox, must_enable_setuid_sandbox,
+ post_fork_parent_callback);
+
+ std::vector<pid_t> extra_children;
+ std::vector<int> extra_fds;
+
+#if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
+ pid_t sancov_helper_pid = ForkSanitizerCoverageHelper(
+ sancov_socket_fds[0], sancov_socket_fds[1], sancov_file_fd.Pass());
+ // It's important that the zygote reaps the helper before dying. Otherwise,
+ // the destruction of the PID namespace could kill the helper before it
+ // completes its I/O tasks. |sancov_helper_pid| will exit once the last
+ // renderer holding the write end of |sancov_socket_fds| closes it.
+ extra_children.push_back(sancov_helper_pid);
+ // Sanitizer code in the renderers will inherit the write end of the socket
+ // from the zygote. We must keep it open until the very end of the zygote's
+ // lifetime, even though we don't explicitly use it.
+ extra_fds.push_back(sancov_socket_fds[1]);
+#endif
+
int sandbox_flags = linux_sandbox->GetStatus();
+ bool setuid_sandbox_engaged = sandbox_flags & kSandboxLinuxSUID;
+ CHECK_EQ(must_enable_setuid_sandbox, setuid_sandbox_engaged);
- Zygote zygote(sandbox_flags, forkdelegate);
+ Zygote zygote(sandbox_flags, fork_delegates.Pass(), extra_children,
+ extra_fds);
// This function call can return multiple times, once per fork().
return zygote.ProcessRequests();
}